Refactor multiagent authority and coding-agent runtime into Rust - #9
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areshand wants to merge 8 commits into
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Refactor multiagent authority and coding-agent runtime into Rust#9areshand wants to merge 8 commits into
areshand wants to merge 8 commits into
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Summary
launch.shonly as the source-checkout compatibility entrypoint and remove obsolete shell/Python workflow implementationsSecurity and authority boundary
The orchestrator can read the repository and all worker/reviewer state, but cannot write the target repository or launch an unrestricted coding-agent process. Writers receive only supervisor-authorized owned paths. Reviewers are read-only and their finalized evidence is sealed to the current canonical diff.
The Linux root malicious-orchestrator suite verifies that direct repository writes, unsafe state mutation, forged reviewer evidence, launch-authorization replay, owned-path breakout, and stale snapshot reuse are denied while a valid scoped worker write succeeds.
Validation
cargo test --locked— 29 passedpython3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v— 57 passedbash tests/run.sh— passedcargo clippy --locked --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings— passedcargo fmt --check— passedtests/malicious-orchestrator.sh— passedSWE-bench Pro first 10 rows
Local EvalScope 1.8.1 run using the official SWE-bench Pro verifier and dataset checkout
ca10a60:Result: 7/10. Previously solved zero-based rows 0, 1, 2, 3, and 6 all remain solved; rows 4 and 5 are newly solved. There is no regression among the previously solved rows.
All ten external trace archives are present and match their manifest SHA-256. The three failures are solve-quality/orchestration misses, not adapter-side rejection:
The row-9 trace directly motivated the final candidate-preservation rule. The ten-row image digest was
3dd67ae209953bd0; the final source-safe bootstrap and candidate-preservation follow-ups landed after that image was launched, so they are covered by regression tests but are not represented as rerun benchmark results.This is a local verifier run, not an official leaderboard submission.